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Abstract 
We study road supply by competing firms between a single origin and destination. In 
previous studies, firms simultaneously set their tolls and capacities while taking the actions of 
the others as given in a Nash fashion. Then, under some widely used technical assumptions, 
firms set a volume/capacity ratio that is socially optimal, and thus the level of travel time or 
service quality is socially optimal. We find that this result does not hold if capacity and toll 
setting take place in separate stages, as then firms want to limit the toll competition by setting 
lower capacities; or when firms set capacities one after another in a Stackelberg fashion, as 
then firms want to limit their competitors’ capacities by setting higher capacities. In our 
Stackelberg competition, the firms that act last have few if any capacity decisions to 
influence. Hence, they are more concerned with the toll-competition substage, and set a 
higher volume/capacity ratio than socially optimal. The firms that act first care more about 
their competitors’ capacities that they can influence: they set a lower volume/capacity ratio. 
So the first firms to enter have a too short travel time from a social perspective, and the last 
firms a too long travel time. The average private travel time is shorter than socially optimal. 
Still, in our numerical model, for three or more firms, welfare is higher under Stackelberg 
competition than under Nash competition, because of the larger total capacity and lower tolls.  
 
JEL codes: D62; L13; R41; R42; R48 
Keywords: Private Road Supply, Oligopoly, Nash Competition, Stackelberg Competition, Service Quality, 
Volume/Capacity ratio, Traffic Congestion, Congestion Pricing 
 
1. Introduction 
As government budgets become increasingly tight, it becomes ever harder to find funds for 
public road expansion in the face of ever-growing congestion on urban and inter-urban 
infrastructures. This has sparked a rising interest in private supply of road capacity. In 
addition, there is a widespread view that private firms operate more efficiently because of 
their profit motive, thereby lowering the cost of capacity. Finally, private roads may offer a 
way to introduce congestion-externality tolling in the face of strong public opposition to 
tolling of existing public roads. In Western Europe, about a third of the highway network is 
currently privately owned (Verhoef, 2007). In the USA, private roads and express-lanes are 
becoming increasingly common; the same is true for many developing countries. Hence, 
private roads form an important and relevant option in contemporary transport policy.  
Yet, there are also disadvantages to private road supply. The private-road operator 
invariably has market power: it is after all impossible to have an infinite number of private 
roads in parallel to ensure a perfectly-competitive outcome. Hence, firms can set tolls and 
capacities that might be profit-maximising, but that are not socially optimal. An important 
question is how harmful this is to social welfare, and to which extend this depends on the 
number of firms. More generally, the private supply of roads raises questions on the social 
desirability of market equilibria, and how best to intervene if outcomes are inefficient. 
The early literature on private roads looked at toll setting by a monopolist on a road of 
given capacity. Unless demand is perfectly elastic, the monopolist generally sets a higher toll 
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than socially optimally and consequently has less congestion and shorter travel times (see, 
e.g., Buchanan, 1956; Mohring 1985; and de Palma and Lindsey, 2000).
1
 
But this argument ignores capacity setting. Xiao, Yang and Han (2007) study private firms 
building and operating parallel roads between a single origin and destination. Firms 
simultaneously determine capacity and tolls while taking the actions of the other as given: i.e. 
there is a single Nash-competition stage (also called an open-loop game in the literature). 
Now, firms set the socially-optimal volume/capacity ratio (i.e. they set the optimal service 
quality) and hence have the same travel time as in the first-best public case. Thus, private 
supply does not lead to a distorted choice of the service quality. Still, firms do set higher tolls, 
build lower capacities, and have fewer users than is socially optimal. Wu, Yin and Yang 
(2011) find that the constant ratio result also holds in a general network. These results are 
conditional on neutral scale economies characterising road building, and travel time being 
homogeneous to the degree zero in volume and capacity. The latter condition means that if 
both the number of cars and capacity double, travel time remains the same, and travel time 
only depends on the volume/capacity ratio. 
The crucial assumption behind the above results is that capacities and tolls are set 
simultaneously. De Borger and Van Dender (2006) use separate Nash-competition substages 
for capacity and toll (i.e. two-substages Nash, or a closed-loop game). Now, firms set a lower 
capacity and a higher volume/capacity ratio (or alternatively a lower service quality), as this 
lessens toll competition and increases equilibrium tolls. This is opposite to the result in the 
earlier literature that only looked at toll setting.  
Separate stages for capacity and toll seem more realistic, as it takes a considerable time to 
build or expand a road whereas the toll could be changed at virtually any moment. However, 
this two substages set-up still assumes that all firms build their roads simultaneously. This 
also seems unrealistic. Obviously, in reality, not all toll roads were built at the same moment. 
And if firms play a sequential capacity game, ―earlier‖ movers are unlikely to take the actions 
of ―later‖ movers as given, and the firms will not compete in a Nash fashion.  
To take this into account, we consider firms first setting their capacities sequentially in a 
Stackelberg fashion, and then simultaneously setting tolls in a Nash fashion. Nash setting of 
tolls seems most realistic, as tolls can be changed frequently and it is hard to credibly commit 
to a toll level.
2
 By setting a larger capacity, a firm can induce firms that follow to set lower 
capacities, which increases its market power and profit. Accordingly, the first few firms to 
enter set a higher capacity than they would without these strategic considerations, and this 
means that their volume/capacity ratios are lower than social optimal (or alternatively that 
their service qualities are higher). The mechanism of De Borger and Van Dender (2006), that 
they want to set a higher ratio to lessen the toll competition, still occur; but, for these first 
firms this is dominated by the capacity effect. The last few firms to enter have few if any 
competitors’ capacities to affect. Hence, they care more about the toll substage, and set a 
higher ratio. In our numerical model, with two firms, the first firm has a lower ratio than 
socially optimal; the second has a higher ratio. With five firms, the first three firms have a 
higher ratio and the last two a lower. The net result is that the average volume/capacity ratio 
on the private roads is lower than socially optimal, and hence average travel time is too short.  
Our analysis concerns road transport, but also has implications for rail transport, airlines, 
airports, and seaports; as well as for non-transport infrastructure such as waste disposal and 
telecommunication. For instance, there is an extensive literature on airlines competing in 
different market structures (see, e.g., Daniel, 1995; Breuckner, 2002; Breuckner and Verhoef, 
                                                 
1 These studies assume that users have identical values of time, and we will follow this assumption. Edelson (1971) and Mills 
(1981) show that with heterogeneous users, the monopolist may charge a lower toll than social optimal. 
2 A firm might make a contract with the government or a consumer organisation. But it seems unlikely that these partners 
would sue for breach of contract when the firm lowers its toll, making this commitment not credible. 
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2010). Zhang and Zhang (2006) study a monopolist airport’s choice of capacity and landing 
fare while carriers have market power, and find that it sets a lower volume/capacity ratio than 
socially optimal. Basso and Zhang (2007) extend this with two airports competing single- or 
two-substages-Nash. Also in these settings, our Stackelberg-capacity game could be applied. 
 
2. Analytics 
2.1. Basic policies 
Consider a case where there are multiple roads connecting a single origin and destination. 
All roads have the same congestion technology and free-flow travel time. Generalised user 
cost, c
i
, of link i (or user cost for brevity) is homogeneous to the degree zero in the number of 
users, q
i
, and capacity, s
i
. Hence, user cost, marginal external cost, and travel time only 
depend on the volume/capacity ratio q
i
/s
i
. The derivative of user cost with respect to the 
number of users is always positive; to capacity it is always negative. Capacity costs are 
proportional to capacity and follow          . Throughout the paper, we assume that 
demand is price sensitive and all roads are congestible. We indicate total capacity by S, and 
total number of users by Q. 
We first discuss some basic policies that act as benchmarks for the oligopolies. Since these 
policies are conventional in the economic literature, we will keep the discussion short; for a 
more detailed discussions please see, among others, Small and Verhoef (2007).  
In the first-best (FB) case, the toll,    , equals the marginal externality, and capacity is set 
so that the marginal cost of capacity expansion, k, equals the reduction in total user cost, 
     , it achieves: 
 
FB
Qc Q   ,  (1) 
Sk c Q   . (2) 
 
Here, subscripts indicate partial derivatives; superscripts indicate the situation or road. So, cQ 
is the derivative of user cost to the number of users Q. 
If a certain initial capacity, s
0
, remains untolled while the new public capacity, s
1
, can be 
tolled, we are in a second-best (SB) situation, as considered earlier by, for example, 
Marchand (1968) and Lévy-Lambert (1968). The SB toll has a term that equals the externality 
on the tolled road,      
 ,  and a negative term to attract users away from the untolled road:
3
  
 
1 0
0
1 0 0
0
.
QSB
q q
Qq
D
c q c q
c D

 
     
 
 
 (3) 
 
The DQ is the derivative of inverse demand to the total number of users, and q
0
 and q
1
 are the 
number of users on the initial and new road. While the toll rule is adapted to reflect the 
second-best distortion, the capacity rule remains (basically) the same: the cost of a marginal 
capacity expansion equals the user cost reduction on the priced link this achieves: 
 
1
1 1.
s
k c q  
 
(4) 
 
Due to the assumptions that c
i
 is homogeneous to the degree zero in q
i
 and s
i
 and that  
  
    
and  
  
   , the  
  
     and      only depend on the volume/capacity ratio (respectively, q
i/si 
and Q/S). Since    
     in (4) and      in (2) both equal k, this implies that the 
volume/capacity ratio must be the same on the tolled SB link and the entire FB network. But 
since there also is the untolled road, the average ratio for the entire SB network is higher.  
                                                 
3 The second term in (3) is negative since DQ is negative while all other variables are positive. 
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Also a single firm (SF) offering capacity in parallel to an untolled road uses capacity rule 
(4), and hence has the same volume/capacity ratio on its road (see also Verhoef and Small, 
2007). Any decrease in user costs can be converted into toll payments, so, for a given number 
of users, it is profit maximising to minimise social cost by using the same capacity rule as in 
the SB case. But the toll of the single firm is higher, as, following (5), the firm adds a mark-
up to the congestion-externality charge as long as demand is not perfectly elastic (i.e. −DQ >
 0) 
and as long as the untolled road is congestible (i.e.    
    .
4
 The firm internalises the 
congestion externality, because again any reduction in user cost can be met by a toll increase. 
The capacities in the single-firm and second-best cases are generally different: the higher 
private toll means that there are fewer users, which given that the volume/capacity ratios are 
same means that the capacity of the single firm is lower. Concluding, volume/capacity ratio of 
the single firm is socially optimal, whereas the choice of toll is distorted by market power. 
 
1 0
0
1 0 0
0
,
QSF
q q
Qq
D
c q q c
c D

 
     
 
 
 (5) 
 
We also look at an untolled road with parallel private firms in perfect competition. This 
perfect competition (PC) case is equivalent to welfare maximisation under a zero-profit 
constraint (see Verhoef, 2008). The corresponding Lagrangian is 
 
     0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
[ ] [ ] [ ] .
Q
PC PD n dn q c q c k s D Q c D Q c q k s                      
  
Note that s1 is the total capacity of the atomistic firms, and 1 is their toll. To find the capacity 
rule, we only need the first order conditions for toll and capacity: 
  
PC 1 1 1/ 0 ,Pq         (6a) 
1 1
PC 1 1 1 1 1/ 0 .P
s s
s q c k c k             (6b) 
 
Eq. (6a) implies          and inserting this into (6b) results in the capacity rule:  
 
1
1 1,
s
k c q     (7) 
 
Thus, the volume/capacity ratio is again the socially optimal one. Interestingly, the toll 
follows the same formula as the first-best toll: 
 
1
1 .
PC
q
c q  
 
(8) 
 
The intuition behind this result follows the self-financing (i.e. zero-profit) result of Mohring 
and Harwitz (1962) with FB pricing. Since, the volume/capacity ratio is the same as with FB 
pricing, the FB toll rule also leads to zero profit with perfect competition; and zero profit is 
what will result from perfect competition. Eq. (8) also implies that the levels of the perfectly-
competitive and first-best toll are the same. The congestion externality is only a function of 
the volume/capacity ratio. Thus, if the first-best and perfectly-competitive volume/capacity 
ratios are equal, the tolls—which equal the marginal externalities—will also be equal.  
 With price-sensitive demand and congestible capacity, the perfectly competitive outcome 
has a higher toll than the SB case, and thus there are fewer users and capacity is lower. At the 
same time, the competition drives the perfectly-competitive toll below that of a single firm. 
                                                 
4 Conversely, in Knight (1924) and Edelson (1971), the firm does not add a mark-up because these authors assume    
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2.2. Single-stage Nash 
For all our oligopolistic regimes, we assume that the initial capacity remains untolled, and 
this will limit the market power of the firms. This set-up seems realistic for many practical 
cases—and of course, when it is not, we are free to set the initial capacity at zero. In other 
words, zero unpriced capacity is just a special case of our model. 
Our first oligopolistic market structure is the single-stage Nash game from Xiao et al. 
(2007). Firms set their capacities and tolls simultaneously. If firms take the tolls and 
capacities of the others as given, they set the socially-optimal volume/capacity ratio. At this 
ratio, the capacity cost of a marginal capacity expansion equals the user cost reduction on this 
link it causes. If the firm offered a higher capacity this would reduce user costs and it could 
ask a higher toll, but then the extra revenue would be smaller than the extra capacity costs. 
Note that firms actually choose their capacity, but since there is complete information this is 
equivalent to choosing the volume/capacity ratio.  
Tolls are higher than with perfect competition as firms have market power, and this also 
means that total number of users and capacity are lower. Yet, as DeVany and Saving (1980) 
and Engel, Fisher and Galetovic (2004) show for a given capacity, as the number of firms 
increases, the equilibrium toll decreases and approaches the perfectly-competitive toll. 
Moreover, as the number of firms increases, total capacity also approaches the perfectly-
competitive one.   
  
2.3. Two-substages Nash 
In the two-substages Nash set-up of De Borger and Van Dender (2006), the capacity 
setting precedes the toll setting. In each substage, firms take the actions of the others in that 
substage as given. Firms have an incentive to set a lower capacity, as this lessens toll 
competition and increases Nash-equilibrium tolls: the lower total capacity is, the higher the 
toll a firm can set due to the higher congestion on the competitors’ roads. This alteration of 
the capacity rule means that firms set a higher volume/capacity ratio than is socially optimal.  
Using the formulas of De Borger and Van Dender (2006), we can write the capacity rule 
for a duopoly as 
 
,*
 ,i
i
i i i
i s
k Stategic effect k q c q
s

      

 (9) 
 
where superscript 
*
 indicates that the toll is determined by the Nash toll-setting substage. Our 
model assumes that the outcome is symmetric in capacities. De Borger and Van Dender 
(2006) find that, for their linear congestion technology and with very low marginal costs of 
capacity (0.25 or lower, where their base case cost is 1), an asymmetric equilibrium would 
result, which has slightly different characteristics. Still, even then, the volume/capacity ratios 
and tolls are higher than with single-stage Nash. We use the ―Bureau of Public Roads‖ (BPR) 
function of travel time, and have only encountered symmetric outcomes in our numerical 
models, even for a marginal capacity cost as low as 0.05 where our base-case cost is 7.
5
 
Therefore, we focus on the symmetric outcome.  
 
2.4. Stackelberg 
In our Stackelberg game, firms set their capacities one after the other. Then the toll setting 
substage follows, in which tolls are set in a Nash fashion. The first firm to act is the leader 
                                                 
5 An advantage of the symmetric outcome is that in the analysis of De Borger and Van Dender (2006), it ensures that the 
response function of firm i’s capacity to firms j’s is negative; with asymmetry this need not be so. We assume that capacity 
costs are high enough to ensure downward-sloping response functions. In our numerical analyses, we have only 
encountered such downward-sloping functions, but our solution method does not assume this. 
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and has the best position. With its capacity, it influences the capacity setting of all other firms, 
as well as the toll substage. By setting a higher capacity, the leader limits the capacities 
chosen by the other firms, which raising its market power. Hence, the capacity rule is 
different than in the fully-competitive case, and the leader’s volume/capacity ratio is lower 
than socially optimal. Still, this lower ratio also has a profit lowering effect: given the actions 
of the others, it would be profit maximising to set the socially-optimal ratio. Optimal capacity 
is found when, for a marginal capacity increase, the profit increasing effect from the induced 
lower capacities of the competitors plus that of the lower user cost equals the profit lowering 
effects from the stronger competition in the toll-setting substage and higher capacity cost. 
If there are many firms acting sequentially, the second firm to act also has an incentive to 
set a lower volume/capacity ratio than is socially optimal. However, its ratio will be above 
that of the first firm, as it has fewer capacity decisions to influence. The last firm to act has no 
capacities to influence. So it is only concerned with the toll setting substage. Just as in De 
Borger and Van Dender’s (2006) two-substages Nash game, this firm sets a lower ratio to 
lessen the toll competition and raise the Nash-equilibrium tolls.  
Since the firms set different volume/capacity ratios, their travel times are different. Since 
the sum of user cost and toll (i.e. the generalised price, or price for brevity) must be the same 
on all roads, the first firm—that has the shortest travel time—can ask the highest toll. The last 
firm has the longest travel time and lowest toll.  
 
2.5. Sequential entry 
 Our last oligopolistic market structure follows Verhoef (2008) and is sequential entry. 
This set-up is in between the two-substages-Nash and Stackelberg set-ups. There are again 
separate substages for capacity and toll. When the first firm enters, it first sets its capacity and 
then toll, assuming that it is and will remain the only firm. Since there are no other players to 
influence, it is profit maximising to have the socially optimal volume/capacity ratio. Then, a 
second firm enters, and optimises its capacity given that there are two firms and anticipating 
the toll-competition in the Nash substage. The capacity of the first firm is fixed, but it can 
change its toll.
6
 The second firm’s capacity influences the toll of the first firm, and this alters 
its capacity-setting rule, resulting in the second firm setting a higher volume/capacity ratio. 
Each further entry follows the same pattern as for two firms.  
The sequential entry set-up might seem inconsistent in that firms are forward-looking to 
the toll substage, but are continuously surprised when further entry occurs (i.e. they are 
myopic to the next capacity stage). Yet, it also seems plausible that firms do not perfectly 
know what the future will bring and optimise given the current situation. Then a remark could 
be made against the Nash and Stackelberg games, in which a firm has to known how many 
firms there will be. In reality, the market structure might be a mix of our Stackelberg and 
sequential-entry games: i.e. a firm does not know how many firms there will be, but has a 
prior belief about the likelihood of each outcome, and optimises given this belief.  
 
3. Numerical model 
We use a numerical model to obtain insights into the relative performance of the schemes 
identified above. The calibration of our model follows Verhoef (2007; 2008). The model is 
simple, but it is calibrated to represent a realistic congested peak-hour highway. User cost 
follows the BPR function, just as in most of the recent literature on private roads: 
 
                                                 
6 This is not as restrictive as it seems. The first firm would like decrease its capacity, but this is not directly possible and 
would certainly not result in its recuperating all capacity costs. Hence, the best it can do is to keep its current capacity. 
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Free-flow travel time, t
f
, is half an hour. Using a free-flow speed of 120 km/hour, this implies 
a trip length of 60 kilometres. The value of time, α, is 7.5. Units of capacity are set so that a 
traffic lane corresponds to a capacity of s
i
=1500. Capacity costs follow          , where k 
equals 7. Since our unit of time is an hour, k is the hourly capacity cost. See Verhoef (2008, 
pp. 476-477) for the derivation of k=7 from the average yearly capital cost of €5 million per 
lane-km or $8 million per lane-mile for freeways in the Netherlands. This cost seems in line 
with the estimates for the USA. Washington State Department of Transport (2005) reports 15 
project from outside the state and 21 from inside the state. For outside the state, median cost 
is about $8 million per lane-mile while a third is above $10 million. For in the state, median 
cost is around $5 million while a quarter is above $10 million. 
All roads have the same congestion and construction technologies and free-flow travel 
time. The initial capacity in the base equilibrium is s
0
=1500. Inverse demand follows  
 
[ ] .D Q A B Q       (11) 
 
The A equals 61.27 and B 0.0117. In the base equilibrium, the price elasticity is −0.5. This 
calibration results in a very congested road in the base case, with a travel time that is 5.4 times 
the free-flow one. If the initial situation were less congested, the gain of private road supply 
and public policies would be lower. We choose this rather extreme level of initial capacity to 
allow a fair number of firms to enter in all regimes (even though we do not impose a 
minimum road size for an entering firm). 
  
3.1. Basic policies and Nash capacity competition 
Table 1 describes the benchmark equilibria. It shows such performance measures as consumer 
surplus, welfare (the sum of consumer surplus and system profit), and relative efficiency, 
which is the welfare gain of a policy from the initial base equilibrium relative to the first-best 
gain. It also gives the volume/capacity ratio averaged over the entire network, on the untolled 
part, and on the tolled part. In the base equilibrium, there is no tolling and capacity is 1500. 
In the first-best (FB) case, capacity is more than twice as large, and the toll equals the 
marginal congestion externality.  
 In the second-best (SB) case, the initial capacity remains untolled, but the new capacity 
has a welfare-maximising toll. Optimal capacity is higher than in the first-best case, but the 
volume/capacity ratio on the tolled part is the same. Due to the low initial capacity, the 
welfare gain of the second-best option is very close to the FB gain. With more initial capacity, 
the relative efficiency would be lower: the capacity expansion would be less important, while 
the detrimental effect of the larger untolled capacity would be larger. The SB set-up makes a 
large loss, and the government has to finance this from other sources. This might be difficult 
in practice, and may lead to tax distortions elsewhere in the economy (which we ignore). 
A single firm building and tolling an extra road is also welfare improving. In fact, private 
road supply is in our setting always welfare improving: the firm makes a profit; whereas the 
consumers cannot be worse off (since if users choose to use the private road, it cannot have a 
higher price than the untolled road). Again, the private road has the same volume/capacity 
ratio as the first-best network. Still, the price and toll are higher, and capacity is lower. 
The final case in Table 1 is perfect competition, which describes what happens when an 
infinite number of firms add capacity in parallel to the untolled capacity. This outcome is a 
useful benchmark for the oligopolistic regimes where firms have market power. Note that the 
perfectly-competitive private operators set the socially-optimal volume/capacity ratio.  
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Table 1. Basic policies 
 
Base 
equilibrium First-best Second-best Single Firm 
Perfect 
competition 
Total capacity (S) 1500 3451.8 3734.0 2078.5 2708.7 
Total demand (Q) 3500 4331.3 4782.7 4331.3 3927.9 
Toll - 5.58 0.31 10.29 5.58 
Overall Q/S 2.333 1.255 1.281 1.890 1.599 
q0/s0 on untolled part 2.333 - 1.320 2.135 1.876 
q1/s1 on tolled part - 1.255 1.255 1.255 1.255 
Price 20.42 11.16 5.46 15.43 10.72 
c0 on untolled part 20.42 - 5.46 15.43 10.72 
c1 on tolled part - 5.14 5.14 5.14 5.14 
System profit -10500 0 -25266 -7083 -10500 
Profit tolled part - 0 -14766 3417.32 0 
Consumer surplus 71484 109468 133472 90029 109468 
Welfare 60984 109468 108206 82946 98968 
Relative efficiency 0 1 0.974 0.453 0.783 
 
Table 2 shows that, with single-stage Nash outcomes for varying number of firms. In all 
oligopolistic settings, a single firm competing leads to the same outcome as the single firm in 
Table 1. We only include it again for easy of reference. All firms set their tolls and capacities 
at the same time. Since the equilibrium is symmetric in that all firms have the same tolls and 
capacities, we give one set of result for any firm i. Because firms take the actions of the others 
a given, the best they can do is set the socially-optimal volume/capacity ratio.  
As the number of firms increases, the single-stage Nash outcome approaches the perfectly-
competitive outcome. With a single firm, the welfare gain is 58% of that with perfect 
competition; with two firms, it is already 83%; and with 5 firms, it is 94% percent. This 
suggests that a limited number of firms may be enough to obtain an equilibrium that is close 
to perfect competition in terms of efficiency. 
 
Table 2. Single-stage Nash competition 
Number of firms 1 2 3 4 5 
Total capacity (S) 2078.5 2411.4 2521.4 2572.7 2602.0 
Total demand (Q) 3928.0 4150.5 4219.6 4250.9 4268.6 
Average toll 10.29 7.69 6.88 6.52 6.31 
Overall Q/S 1.890 1.721 1.673 1.652 1.640 
q0/s0 on the untolled part 2.135 2.005 1.959 1.937 1.924 
qi/si on each private road 1.255 1.255 1.255 1.255 1.255 
Price 15.43 12.83 12.03 11.66 11.46 
Profit firm i 3417.3 1206.7 557.2 315.9 202.6 
Consumer surplus 90029 100518 103892 105440 106319 
Welfare 82946 92432 95064 96204 96832 
Relative efficiency 0.453 0.649 0.703 0.726 0.739 
Welfare gain relative to 
perfect competition 
0.578 0.828 0.897 0.927 0.944 
 
 
3.2 Two-substages Nash Competition 
Now we turn to the first of three set-ups where firms set their capacities strategically to 
influence the actions the other firms. These strategic considerations change the capacity rule, 
which means that firms have a different volume/capacity ratio than is socially optimal. As 
Table 3 shows, with two-substages Nash competition, firms have an incentive to set a lower 
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capacity and higher ratio, because this lessens toll competition, thereby raising Nash-
equilibrium tolls. However, this higher ratio comes at a cost for the firm: it raises travel time 
and this lowers the toll users are willing to pay. The profit-maximising capacity is found 
where, for a marginal capacity increase, the profit-enhancing effect of the lower user costs 
equals the detrimental effect of the lower tolls of the competitors and higher capacity cost.  
With two firms, the welfare gain of two-substages Nash is much lower than with a single 
stage, since total capacity is lower and tolls are higher. Yet, as the number of firms increases 
the advantage for the firms of the separate setting of capacity and toll decreases. Our results 
indicate that this two-substages Nash game approaches single-stage Nash and perfect 
competition as the of firms becomes large. This is also logical, if there are many firms, it is 
hard for a firm to influence the toll setting of others, as it only controls a tiny part of the total 
capacity. Hence, then the outcome is close to the single-stage Nash, where it is impossible to 
affect the toll setting of other firms.  
 
Table 3. Two-substages Nash competition 
Number of firms 1 2 3 4 5 
Total capacity (S) 2078.5 2292.3 2404.4 2470.2 2513.1 
Total demand (Q) 3928.0 4087.1 4159.9 4200.0 4225.2 
Average toll 10.29 8.27 7.44 6.99 6.72 
Overall Q/S 1.890 1.966 1.815 1.747 1.710 
q0/s0 2.135 2.044 1.999 1.972 1.955 
qi/si 1.255 1.288 1.285 1.280 1.277 
Price 15.43 13.57 12.72 12.26 11.96 
Profit firm i 3417.3 1449.6 772.1 474.1 319.2 
Consumer surplus 90029 97472 100971 102931 104170 
Welfare 82946 89871 92787 94328 95266 
Relative efficiency 0.453 0.596 0.656 0.688 0.707 
Welfare gain relative 
to perfect competition 
0.578 0.760 0.837 0.878 0.903 
 
3.3. Sequential entry set-up 
The sequential-entry market structure follows Verhoef (2008). Firms again have separate 
capacity and toll decisions. The difference is that now firms enter sequentially. First, firm 1 
enters, and sets its capacity and then its toll, assuming that it will be the only firm. Next, a 
second firm enters and sets its profit-maximising capacity given that there are two firms while 
taking into account how this affects the toll-setting substage. So the first firm’s capacity is 
fixed, as this is a long-term decision; while its toll can be changed, as this is a short run 
decision. The entry pattern is the same for the third and further entrants. Firms are thus 
forward looking to the toll-setting substage, but myopic to the next entry (i.e. the next 
capacity stage). The difference with the two-substages Nash is that now firms build their road 
sequentially, which seems more realistic as not all roads have been build at the same time.  
As Table 4 shows, even though all firms have the same cost structures and congestion 
technologies, they are now ex-post asymmetric. This is due to the sequential decision making. 
The first firm sets a much higher capacity than it would under single- or two- substages Nash 
competition, and this limits the capacities that the others will set. Yet, this sequential decision 
making need not be good for the firms, as becomes clear when comparing the profits shown 
in Fig. 1 (sequential entry) with those in Table 3 (two-substages Nash). For 4 or more firms, 
firm 1’s profit is lower with sequential entry than with two-stage Nash. Firm 2 always has a 
lower profit with sequential entry. Sequential entry leads to a higher total capacity, and thus to 
stronger toll competition. For the up to 5 firms we study, sequential entry gives a higher 
welfare gain than Nash competition. 
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Table 4. Results under sequential entry 
Number of firms 1 2 3 4 5 
Total capacity (S) 2078.5 2399.1 2576.4 2670.3 2718.6 
Total demand (Q) 3928.0 4138.4 4237.3 4285.0 4308.4 
Average toll 10.29 7.86 6.80 6.30 6.05 
Overall Q/S 1.890 1.725 1.645 1.605 1.585 
q0/s0 2.135 2.012 1.946 1.912 1.894 
Capacity  firm 1 (s1) 578.5 578.5 578.5 578.5 578.5 
Capacity  firm 2 (s2) - 320.5 320.5 320.5 320.5 
Capacity  firm 3 (s3) - - 177.4 177.4 177.4 
Capacity  firm 4 (s4) - - - 93.8 93.8 
Capacity  firm 5 (s5) - - - - 48.3 
Price 15.43 12.98 11.82 11.26 10.99 
Consumer surplus 90029 99931 104767 107138 108308 
Welfare 82946 91939 95687 97365 98153 
Relative efficiency 0.453 0.638 0.716 0.750 0.767 
Welfare gain relative to 
perfect competition 
0.578 0.814 0.910 0.953 0.973 
 
Fig. 1. Firm profit by the number of firms under sequential entry 
 
 
Fig. 2. The toll of each firm by the number of firms under sequential entry 
 
 
 As the number of firms increases, total capacity increases and tolls decrease (see Fig 2), 
leading to lower profits. Firm 1 always attains the largest profit due to its largest size. The 
later a firm entered, the lower its profit will be.  
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The sequential-entry market structure does not approach perfect competition when the 
number of firms goes to infinity. With 5 firms, total capacity is already above the perfectly-
competitive level, and the entries of the sixth and seventh firms only increase capacity further 
(these cases are not shown, but for this game they were calculated). It is perhaps surprising 
that an above perfectly-competitive capacity level can be profitable. The reason is that, with 
five firms, a firm still has market power, and adds a mark-up to the toll (see Fig. 2); whereas 
with perfect competition, the toll equals the congestion externality and the mark-up is zero. At 
some point, there will be no further entry, as this would decrease market power so much that 
the entering firm would make a loss. Still, the welfare loss from this game never reaching 
perfect competition is limited. Two firms entering sequentially gives a consumer surplus that 
is 9% lower and welfare gain that is 19% lower than with prefect competition; for five firms 
these figures are, respectively, 1% and 3%. 
An intriguing result from the sequential-entry market structure is the development of the 
volume/capacity ratios in Fig 3. When firm 1 enters, it sets the socially-optimal ratio, since 
there are no other players to influence. When firm 2 enters, it sets a higher ratio, because this 
increases Nash-equilibrium tolls, thereby increasing its profit. Because the first capacity is 
fixed but the new entry attracts users away, the first firm’s volume/capacity ratio decreases 
and is now lower than socially optimal. The average ratio on the private roads also decreases, 
because firm 1 is larger. For later entries a similar pattern holds: the entrant sets a ratio that is 
higher than socially optimal to limit the toll competition, and the ratios of the incumbents and 
the overall ratio decrease.  
 
Fig. 3. Volume capacity ratio under sequential entry 
 
 
3.4. Stackelberg capacity competition 
Our last market structure extends the previous one by making firms forward looking in 
their capacity choices: they recognise that their capacity influences the capacity setting of all 
following firms as well as the Nash toll-setting substage. The difference with the previous 
setting is that now firms know how many firms there will be, whereas before they assumed 
that they were the last entrant. It is important to emphasise that for each number of firms the 
table and figures give the results after the final stage. Unlike with sequential-entry, the various 
number of firms should not be interpreted as intermediate stages in the same dynamic process. 
Table 5 and Fig. 4 show the results. With two firms, the leader sets a higher capacity and 
lower volume/capacity ratio than the follower, which means that the leader has more market 
power and a shorter travel time, allowing it to can ask a higher toll. Still, the leader’s capacity 
is below the one with sequential entry, as this lower capacity lessens toll competition, which 
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raises profit even though it also raises the capacity of firm 2. The leader’s capacity is well 
above the single- or two-substages-Nash level. For three or more entrants, the set-up and the 
results follow the same lines.  
 
Table 5. Results under Stackelberg capacity competition 
Number of firms 1 2 3 4 5 
Total capacity (S) 2078.5 2397.6 2564.2 2647.2 2686.6 
Total demand (Q) 3928.0 4137.8 4233.6 4279.0 4301.2 
Average toll 10.29 7.87 6.82 6.32 6.06 
Overall Q/S 1.890 1.726 1.651 1.616 1.601 
q0/s0 2.135 2.013 1.949 1.916 1.890 
Capacity  firm 1 (s1) 578.5 576.2 543.4 489.7 428.3 
Capacity  firm 2 (s2) - 321.5 336.5 350.7 345.8 
Capacity  firm 3 (s3) - - 184.3 201.0 226.5 
Capacity  firm 4 (s4) - - - 105.8 122. 
Capacity  firm 5 (s5) - - - - 63.2 
Price 15.43 12.98 11.86 11.33 11.08 
Consumer surplus 90029 99902 104580 106837 107949 
Welfare 82946 91916 95558 97177 97943 
Relative efficiency 0.453 0.638 0.713 0.746 0.762 
Welfare gain relative to 
perfect competition 
0.578 0.814 0.910 0.953 0.973 
 
Fig. 4. Volume capacity ratio on each road under Stackelberg capacity competition 
 
For an end equilibrium with up to 4 firms, the volume/capacity ratio of firm 1 decreases 
with the number of firms. Yet, with 5 firms, it is higher than with 4 firms. This suggests that, 
as the number of firms increases even further, the ratios of all firms may approach the 
socially-optimal ratio. With more firms, it is more difficult to influence the capacity and toll 
setting of others, and trying this becomes less profitable. Conversely, the profit loss from 
setting a lower ratio remains, in that the increase in capacity cost is larger than the toll 
revenue gain due to the lower travel time; while for a higher ratio, the capacity cost reduction 
is offset by a larger loss in revenue. Only when it is possible to influence the actions of the 
others is it profitable to set a different ratio, but with many firms, the strategic effect is small. 
This suggests that our Stackelberg market structure also approaches perfect competition as the 
number of firms becomes large, just as with standard Stackelberg competition. Certainly, as 
Figs. 5 and 6 indicate, the tolls and profits approach the perfectly-competitive outcome. 
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Fig. 5. The toll of each firm by the final number of firms under Stackelberg competition 
 
 
Fig. 6. Firm profit by the final number of firms under Stackelberg competition 
 
 
3.5. Comparison of the oligopolistic market structures 
Fig. 7 compares the average volume/capacity ratio in the different oligopolistic settings. It 
also shows the ratio with perfect competition (which is the socially optimal one) as a 
benchmark. Single-stage Nash results in constant private volume/capacity ratios that are 
socially optimal. When the capacity and toll competitions are separate substages, firms set a 
higher ratio to lessen the later toll competition. Still, this ratio seems to approach the 
perfectly-competitive level as the number of firms increases. Conversely, when firms set their 
capacities one after the other, the average ratio is below the perfectly competitive one. For 
Stackelberg competition, the average seems to level off at five firms. And we expect, when 
number of firms becomes even larger, that the average will increase again and approach the 
perfectly-competitive level: with more firms it becomes ever more difficult to influence your 
competitors’ capacities and tolls, and this makes strategic capacity setting less attractive.  
Sequential entry never reaches perfect competition because at some point capacity is so 
high that no further entry is profitable. Moreover, as Fig. 8 also shows, in our numerical 
model, the capacity level with 5 firms is already above with perfect competition, and further 
entry only increases capacity.  
Figs. 8 to 10 compare the capacities, average tolls, and relative efficiencies in the different 
market structures. All set-ups lead to substantial welfare gains that, even for 2 firms, are 
relatively close to the perfectly-competitive level. Only with a single firm is the relative 
efficiency much lower with 0.453. Two-substages Nash attains of all oligopolies the lowest 
gain, as firms build less capacity and have higher tolls.  
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The Stackelberg and sequential entry games have very similar results. A weakness of the 
Stackelberg model is that firms have to know how many firms there will be with certainty. 
Conversely, with sequential entry, each firm assumes that it is the last entry, and every firm is 
―surprised‖ when a further entry occurs. Both models seem useful benchmarks, and it seems 
likely that in reality the outcome would be a mix of the two games. 
 
Fig. 7. Weighted average volume/capacity ratio on the private roads 
 
 
Fig. 8. Total capacity and the number of firms 
 
 
Fig. 9. Weighted average toll and the number of firms 
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Fig. 10. Relative efficiency and the number of firms 
 
 
It is important to perform sensitivity analyses to important parameters. We focus on the 
effect of the amount of initial capacity. The effects of other such standard things as price 
elasticity and value of time are as one would expect: e.g. more price sensitive demand makes 
private provision more beneficial, as it limits market power. With more initial capacity, the 
gain of the first-best policy is lower, since there is less to gain from the capacity expansion. 
For the second-best, single-firm, and perfect-competition cases the gain and relative 
efficiency are lower: capacity expansion is less important and there is more initial capacity 
that remains untolled (see also Verhoef, 2007). The oligopolistic settings also attain lower 
gains; but relative to perfect competition they fare better, because the larger untolled capacity 
limits the oligopolistic market power.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper reconsidered capacity, price, and service-quality setting of private competitors 
in oligopolistic markets for congestible services applied to the case of road transport. Previous 
studies found that, under some technical assumptions, firms competing in parallel set a 
volume/capacity ratio that is socially optimal if they take the actions of the others as given in 
a Nash fashion. We find that this single-stage Nash-competition assumption is crucial. If 
firms can influence the decisions of others with their capacity, this changes their capacity-
setting rule, and they generally set a different ratio than the socially optimal one.  
In our Stackelberg market structure, firms first set their capacities one after another and 
then set their tolls in a Nash fashion. Firms have two strategic considerations: (1) they want to 
limit the capacities of firms that follow by setting a higher capacity, and (2) they want to limit 
the toll competition by setting a lower capacity. The first firms to act have many capacities to 
influence, and hence set a higher capacity and lower volume/capacity ratio than they 
otherwise would. The last firms have few if any capacities to influence, and set a higher ratio.  
Strategic setting of a lower capacity to limit toll competition is harmful for welfare as it 
lowers capacities and increases tolls. Stackelberg setting of higher capacities to limit 
competitors’ capacities can be good or bad for welfare: it increases the market power of the 
leaders, but also tends to increase total capacity and to decrease the average toll. The 
Stackelberg oligopoly seems to approach perfect competition as the number of firms 
increases. In our numerical model, the Stackelberg game attains, with 2 firms, 81% of the 
perfectly-competitive gain; with 5 firms, this is 97%. A general result is that the effect of 
private road supply depends on the number of competitors and on the market structure: the 
outcomes are different in the single-stage Nash, two-substages Nash, and Stackelberg set-ups.  
The reader might wonder whether our setting with many firms competing in parallel is 
realistic, as it is rare to have many toll roads going to the same destination. However, if the 
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number of toll road keeps increasing, which seems likely, the chance that there are multiple 
roads going roughly in the same direction increases. Moreover, also with different network 
structures, strategic capacity setting might affect the outcome. An obvious follow-up are serial 
markets or combined serial-and-parallel markets such as in Verhoef (2008). While such 
stylised networks may provide interesting insights, complementary analyses using larger, 
more realistic, networks may give further insights that would be relevant for applied policy: 
notably, for the design of auctions for the right to build and operate a private infratructure. 
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